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The appellant,

Eryck Aston, seeks an Order of this Court

quashing the Writ of Execution previously issued in this matter,
vacating the trial court' s Order and Decree issued pursuant to
the Writ,

and directing that all of the property seized from

Eryck be redelivered to him.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal was poured over into this court by the Utah
Supreme

Court.

Jurisdiction lies

in this

court pursuant

to

Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and U. C. A. §7822a-3(2)j.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The proceeding
Execution.
1.

on appeal

was

one to enforce

a Writ

of

(R. 1703. )
The first issue on appeal is whether the reversal of

the Decree of Divorce between Bruno D'Aston and Dorothy D'Aston,
(the Decree from which the Writ of Execution was issued,) renders
the Writ and all proceedings related to it, including the Order
of March 9, 1990, void.

This issue is one of law.

of review is for correctness.

The standard

Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790

P. 2d 587 (Utah 1990).
2.

The

underlying

second

Decree

of

issue

is

Divorce

whether

the

reversal

of

the

mandates

the

reversal

of

the

proceedings between Bruno and Eryck where, because of the trial
court' s reliance upon the reversed Decree and Findings, and the
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, Eryck was prevented
from having a full and fair plenary hearing.

1

The issue is one of

law.

The standard of review is for correctness.

3.

Brinkerhoff.

The third issue is whether the trial court erred in

awarding attorney's fees to Bruno D' Aston as costs.
is

one

of

law.

The

standard

for

review

is

This issue

correctness.

Brinkerhoff. &££££•
4.
1.

Additional issues for review are set forth in Appendix

These issues are material only if the court should determine

that the reversal of the Decree of Divorce does not mandate the
reversal of the Order on appeal.

STATUTES ANQ CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 69(a), U. R. C. P. states in part that:
Process to enforce a judgment shall be by a
writ of execution unless the Court otherwise
directs . . . (Emphasis added. )
The full text of Rule 69(a) is attached.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding is part of the divorce action between Bruno
D'Aston (Bruno) and Dorothy D'Aston.
Bruno

and

Dorothy

was

entered

Bruno' s and Dorothy' s son.

A Decree of Divorce between

in December,

In April

of

1988.

Eryck is

1989, the plaintiff

obtained, ex parte, a Writ of Execution pursuant to the Decree of
Divorce.

(R. 1707.)

Using the Writ of Execution, Bruno seized

coins, silver bullion and other items of personal property from
Eryck' s business.
In January of 1990, a three day hearing was held before the
Honorable Ray Harding pursuant to the Writ of Execution.
March

9,

1990,

Judge

Harding

executed

an Order

and

On

Decree

pursuant to the Writ and the Decree of Divorce which awarded part

2

of the seized property to Bruno and part of the property to
Eryck.

(R. 2325. )

Subsequent to the entry of the March 9, 1990 Order, this
Court reversed the Decree of Divorce between Bruno and Dorothy
and

remanded

the

matter

to the

district

court

for

further

proceedings, including proceedings to determine the ownership and
distribution

of property which was

the subject

of the Writ.

ID' Aston v. D'Aston, 136 U. A. R. 47 (Ut. App. 1990)).

Many post-

trial motions have been filed, the vast majority of which have
not been considered or ruled upon by the trial court, including
Eryck

Aston's

requesting

that

Motion
the

under

trial

Rule

court

60(b)

identify

and

other

items

of

motions
personal

property to be included in its Order and Decree dated March 9,
1990.

This appeal was originally lodged in the Supreme Court and

poured over in this Court.

Bruno D'Aston has cross-appealed,

STATEMENT Of TACTS
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented for
review:
1.

On December 15, 1988, the Fourth District Court entered

a Decree of Divorce between Bruno D' Aston and Dorothy D' Aston.
The Decree has appended to it a significant number of exhibits
listing various items of coins and personal property which were
awarded by the Decree of Divorce to Bruno D'Aston.
2.

(R. 467. )

In April, 1989, Bruno obtained a Writ of Execution and

Assistance based upon the 1988 Decree of Divorce which directed
the constable to,
" . . . take into your possession all property
described in the exhibits attached to the
Decree wherever it may be located and hold it
until further order of the court. "
3

(R. 1708. )
3.

On or about April 29, 1989, pursuant to the Writ of

Execution
Bruno' s

and Assistance,
son,

Eryck,

Constables

and

possession of Eryck.

seized

entered

hundreds

the

of

business

items

from

of
the

The items taken included silver dollars,

bullion and collectable coins.

(The inventory of the items taken

is Trial Exhibit 15. )
4.
this

In June of 1990, the Decree of Divorce was reversed by

Court

D' Aston.

and
136

remanded
U. A. R.

to the district
49

(June

14,

court.

1990).)

(D'Aston v.
In

its

prior

consideration of this divorce, this Court stated:
. . . we reverse the trial court7 s property
division and remand for enforcement of the
1973 postnuptial property agreement and then
the division of the remaining property, if
any, not controlled by it.
No subsequent Decree has been entered by the district court on
remand.
5.

The items

of property

seized

from

Eryck Aston were

held without bond by Wells Fargo during the pendency of these
proceedings.

On June 12, 1989, the trial court agreed to set an

evidentiary hearing with respect to the Writ.

(R. 2067. )

Bruno

"claim[ed] the items to be his, which items were seized pursuant
to a Writ of Execution out of this court. "
also

claimed

"all

the

items

taken

into

(R. 2130. )
possession

Bruno
by

the

constable, other than a 1988 twenty dollar gold piece and some
other minor items, are property which was separate property of
the [Bruno] and awarded to the [Bruno] as set forth in Exhibits
22 and 23, attached to the Decree, or was consigned property to
which the

[Bruno] is entitled

to possession as set

4

forth on

Exhibit 24, attached to the Decree."
1990,

(R. 2183- )

In January of

a hearing was conducted before the Fourth District Court

regarding the Writ of Execution.
6.

(R. 2209. )

Subsequent to the hearing, the Court made findings of

fact, conclusions of law and entered an Order which awarded part
of the property to Bruno and part to Eryck.
7.

(R. 2316-2330.)

A part of the property awarded to Bruno was claimed to

have been obtained on consignment from an entity known as "1841."
The principal of "1841" was Michael Graham, a resident of Oregon.
Prior to the hearing, Eryck took Michael Graham' s deposition.
During the deposition, Mr. Graham testified under oath that he
had never consigned any coins or bullion to Baruno Aston, that he
would not have had the type of coins or bullion listed in the
purported

consignment documents

to consign to Bruno, that he

never had any Canadian coins like those consigned, that " 1841"
had never used forms similar to those which were part of the
Exhibit 24 to the Divorce Decree.

(Deposition, pp. 31, 35, 38,

41,

T.

45,

68; Deposition published

500. )

The trial

court

refused to admit this testimony, stating that:
And the Court will hear no testimony on the
issue of whether or not the consigned coins
are the property of [Bruno] as that issue was
decided by Judge Park. (T. 4, 5. )
In a subsequent order, the trial court stated that:
"Ownership of these consigned items and any
obligations that go with them is not the
subject of this action." (R. 2315.)

SPMMftRY OF ARgPMBMT
The Writ of Execution and the subsequent Order and Decree
entered pursuant to the Writ are void, ipso facto, as a result of
the

reversal

of

the

underlying
5

judgment.

38 Am. Jur. 2d,

Executions

§12, 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error §955, 956.

There

cannot be an execution on a reversed judgment.
Because of the Decree of Divorce (now reversed), and Judge
Hardings' rulings that the Decree precluded his consideration of
crucial aspects of ownership, Eryck was denied a plenary hearing
on the issues purportedly decided by Judge Harding.
the

district

collateral

court

applied

principles

of

res

estoppel in reaching its decision.

In effect,

judicata

and

Because of the

reversal of the Decree of Divorce, those principles should not
have been applied.
The

district

court

awarded

Bruno

attorney' s

fees

in

connection with the out-of-state deposition of Michael Graham.
As a matter of law, the fees should not have been awarded.
Finally,

if

this

court

should

determine

that

the

first

hearing should not be reversed as a matter of law, additional
issues on appeal are set forth in Appendix

1 attached to and

filed as a part of this brief.
ARglTMENT

L
THE WRIT OF EXECUTION SHOULD BE QUASHED. THE
QfiDSR REjVERgjSD AND Tfrg PfiQPgRTY RSTViWEP TQ
ERYCK.
This proceeding between Bruno and Eryck involved property
seized from Eryck pursuant to a Writ of Execution issued in April
of 1989.

The Writ of Execution was issued pursuant to the Decree

of Divorce entered in December of 1988 between Bruno and Dorothy.
(R. 1707. )
The Writ of Execution (R. 1708) directed the Constable to:
" . . . take into your possession all property
described in the exhibits attached to the
6

Decree wherever it may be located and hold it
until further order of the court. "
Based upon the Writ, the constable seized hundreds of items of
personal property from Eryck' s store, The Gold Connection.
Rule 69, U. R. C. P. begins by stating that "process to enforce
a

1 udament

shall

be

a writ

otherwise directs . . . . "

of

execution,

unless

(Emphasis added. )

the

court

The Decree of

Divorce has now been reversed, D' Aston v. D' Aston. 136 UAR 47
(Utah App. 1990),

and

remanded

to

the district

court

for a

redetermination of the property division between the parents.
A judgment is the life blood of a Writ of Execution.
is the mechanism to enforce a judgment.

A Writ

Because the Judgment

has been reversed, there remains no basis in law for the Writ of
Execution to have been issued in the first instance or for the
Order and Decree subsequently entered on March 9, 1990 to remain
in effect.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Executions §12; Rest. Judgments. 2d §16;

5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal

& Error

§955,

956.

When a judgment is

reversed, all proceedings had under the judgment are ipso facto
void and of no effect.

All dependent proceedings and orders fall

with the reversal of the judgment.

5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error,

§955, 956.
In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Bonebrake. 320 P. 2d 975 (Colo.
1958) a judgment was
Insurance.
garnishee
against

entered

against the insureds

of

Zurich

A Writ of Garnishment issued against insurer and a
judgment

Zurich

was

followed.
on

While

appeal,

the

the

garnishee

underlying

reversed on appeal and remanded to the trial court.
Supreme Court, in the garnishee appeal stated that:

7

judgment

judgment

was

The Colorado

The reversal of a judgment upon which a
garnishment is based leaves nothing to
sustain the judgment against the garnishee. .
• • The existence of a valid judgment is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to garnishment
relief (citation omitted. ) As the judgment
in the main case has been reversed, and
because it is made the basis of the
garnishment, it must follow that the judgment
in the garnishment proceeding cannot stand
alone and must be reversed. 320 P. 2d 976.
In Lohman vT Lehman, 246 S. W. 2d 368 (Mo. 1952) the plaintiff
procured an execution following the entry of a Decree of Divorce.
The

Decree was

determined

subsequently

set

aside.

The

appellate

that the Writ of Execution issued pursuant

court
to the

Decree fell with the Decree and the court quashed the Writ of
Execution.

This result is consistent with the law of judgments

generally.

comment c to the Restatement of Judgments 2d, §16,

states in part:
If, when the eailier judgment is set aside or
reversed/ the lcter judgment is still subject
to a post-judgment motion for a new trial or

the like, or is still open on appeal, . . . a
party may inform the trial or appellate court
of the nullification of the earlier judgment
and the consequent elimination of the basis
of the later judgment. The court should then
normally set aside the later judgment.
(Emphasis added. )
This general principle has long been recognized.

In Butler v.

Eaton. 141 U.S. 240 (1891), a bank shareholder was involved in
two actions brought by the bank.

In a state court action, a

judgment was entered in her favor which she used successfully in
defense of a second federal court action.
the Supreme Court.

Both cases went up to

The Supreme Court reversed the state court

decision, and was then confronted with the issue of how to handle
the second federal court decision.
Court stated:

8

The United States Supreme

It is apparent from an inspection of the
record that the whole foundation of that part
of the judgment which is in favor of the
defendant is, to our judicial knowledge,
without any validity, force or effect, and
ought never to have existed.
Why, then,
should not we reverse the judgment which we
know of record has become erroneous, and save
the parties the delay and expense of taking
ulterior proceedings in the court below to
effect the same object. (at 244.)
In Phebus v. Dunford.

198 P. 2d 973 (Utah 1948),

the Utah

Supreme Court recognized, in a factually different context, the
general rule that the reversal of a judgment or a decision of a
lower court places the case in the position it was before the
lower court rendered the decision, and vacates all proceedings
and orders dependent upon the decision which was reversed.

198

P. 2d at 974.
In many respects, this case is similar to that of Kellv v.
Scott, 298 P.2d 821 (Utah 1956).

In Kellv. supra, a realtor was

granted a judgment for a commission earned for procuring a buyer
for real estate.
the

action

The Supreme Court subsequently determined in

between

the

buyer

and

seller that there was

binding contract and that the sale was not enforceable.
basis

of the reversal

seller,

the

commission.
Kelly

and

Supreme

this

On the

of the judgment between the buyer and
Court

reversed

Where the two proceedings
in

no

action,

it is

judgment upon which a subsequent

the

Judgment

for

the

are interwoven, as in

impossible

to reverse the

claim is predicated without

reversing the subsequent proceeding.
Applied to this matter, where the Writ of Execution was
issued on a Decree of Divorce which has now been reversed, the
Writ and all proceedings incident to it including the Order and
9

Decree of March

9#

1990, are ifi&Q £&£££ void.

The Writ of

Execution issued in April of 1989 should be quashed,

and the

property seized pursuant thereto should be redelivered to Eryck.
Adams

v.

JonathQtt WPOClngr CQ, , 475 A, 2d 393,

398

(D. C. App.

1984).

LL
ERYCK WAS DENIED A FULL AMP

FAIR TRIAL

PROCEEDING BECAUSE OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.

WHICH DECREE HA? NQW BEEN REVERSED,
Apart

from the Writ of Execution,

the hearing which was

conducted in this matter was so limited in scope and in evidence
that

it

cannot

stand

alone

as

a full

and

fair trial.

The

proceeding between Bruno and Eryck was not a plenary proceeding.
The limited nature of the hearing was recognized both by the
Court and Bruno.

For example, in his minute entry dated June 12,

1989

Judge Park set an "evidentiary hearing"

(R.

2067),

respect to the Writ.

with

In Bruno' s subsequent request to reschedule

the hearing, he ". . . claims the items to be his, which items
were seized pursuant to a writ of execution issued out of this
court."

(R. 2130.)

Later, the "motion for an Order to deliver

the properties to Bruno [was] scheduled for hearing by this Court
commencing January 8, 1990. "

(R. 2186. )

During the course of the hearing on the Writ, the trial
court made it abundantly clear to the parties on many occasions
that the type of evidence which it would consider was limited by
the Decree of Divorce.

For example,

at the outset the trial

court stated as follows:
And the court will hear no testimony on the
issue of whether or not the consigned coins
are the property of the plaintiff as that
issue was decided by Judge Park. (T. 4-5. )
10

Later when Eryck attempted to introduce the testimony of
Michael

Graham

regarding

a significant

number

of

coins

and

bullion that Bruno claimed he had obtained through consignment,
Judge Harding excluded that evidence and limited its use to the
impeachment of Bruno' s testimony.
from

the

outset

that

(T. 499. )

Eryck would

not

and

It was very clear
in

fact was

not

permitted to go behind the matters which Judge Harding considered
to have been determined by the Decree of Divorce.

This situation

was made even more onerous because Judge Harding had not tried
the divorce proceeding.
During the divorce proceeding, Bruno testified that he had
coins from two consignments, one from Michael Graham' s Company
" 1841" and a second from Al Schafer.
During the hearing

(R. 538, 531-33, 536-37.)

on the Writ, Bruno acknowledged

that the

consignment from Al Schafer was not in fact a consignment.
225. )

(T.

Many of the coins which Bruno was awarded pursuant to the

Decree and the Writ were based upon this consignment.

(F. F. 21;

R. 2322.)

'In fact, Bruno's testimony at the divorce trial that

the

were

coins

consigned

allowed

them to be awarded

to him

without any requirement that he account to Dorothy for their
value.
(R.

Bruno acknowledged his own misstatements on this subject.

269, 268. )

Because the coins

from the consignment were

awarded to Bruno by the Decree, Eryck was not permitted to attack
the consignment or the divorce court' s order that those coins
were to be awarded to Bruno.
To make matters worse, Bruno then relied upon the Divorce
Decree and its award of "consigned"

coins to him as the sole

basis for his claim to many of the items seized from Eryck.
11

The

trial

court

effectively

applied

principals

of

res

judicata and collateral estoppel to limit the evidence and the
issues

which

it

would

consider

in

this

proceeding.

This

collateral estoppel effect is reflected at length in the court' s
Findings of Fact, in particular numbers 18, 19 and 21.
2322. )

(R. 2319-

Throughout its findings, the Court relied extensively on

the Decree.

Ultimately, the only items awarded to Bruno were

those which the trial court believed had been awarded to Bruno by
the Decree of Divorce.
The

law

is

clear

that

the

basis

collateral estoppel is a final judgment.

§4 57; frexiggtQP Pevelopeyg,

Lnsa

z,

for

res

judicata

or

46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments

Q' Weill Construction Cot«

LQCi, 238 S. E. 2d 771 (Ga. A. 1977); Smith v. Smith. 793 P. 2d 407,
409

(Utah App.

1990).

In this

action,

there

is

judgment, the Decree of Divorce having been reversed.
no

basis

for

the

application

of

principles

of

no

final

There is
collateral

estoppel and res judicata.
Even apart

from issues

of collateral

estoppel where, as

here, a judgment is of such a nature that the rights of coparties may be derivative or interdependent in nature and where
the reversal

as to some parties will result in injustice to

others, that judgment as to the others should also be reversed.
General Portland Land Development v. Stevens. 356 So. 2d 840, 842
(Fla. App. 1978).
The

reversible

consequences

of

the

court' s rulings

and

limitations on evidence is most readily observed in its rulings
on the consignment.

Graham testified in his deposition that the

consignment to Bruno had never occurred.
12

(Depo. , p. 31, 35, 38,

41, 45, 68).
499. )

The court refused to consider this testimony.

(T.

Given Graham' s testimony on the issue of the consigned

coins, and the court' s determination that the testimony of Bruno
was not particularly credible (R. 2238), without the Decree of
Divorce the trial court there would have been no evidence to
support a finding that the consigned coins allegedly from 1841
belonged to Bruno.
A second

consignment

Bruno from Al Schaefer.

of coins was

allegedly

received by

Judge Harding also refused to reconsider

ownership of any of these consigned coins because of the Decree
of Divorce.

This refusal occurred even after Bruno changed his

testimony

that

Schaefer.

(T. 264, 265. )

The

there

exclusion

significant.

had

of

never

been

evidence

on

a consignment

the

from Al

consignments

is

A different result would have necessarily followed

had the evidence been considered.

This is because Bruno relied

entirely upon the Decree of Divorce to establish his rights to
the consignment items.

Under the standards of Rule 61, U. R. C. P. ,

the trial court' s reliance on the Decree and its limitation of
the evidence constitute reversible error.
If the proceeding between Bruno and Eryck is anything other
than the enforcement of the Writ of Execution, Eryck was denied a
full and fair plenary hearing on the issues of ownership of the
coins which were seized.

In the event that this Court should disagree with the
conclusion that Eryck was denied a plenary hearing, Eryck has set
forth in Appendix 1 to this Brief his arguments as to why the
findings and conclusions of the trial court were otherwise
clearly erroneous, so as to warrant reversal.
13

ILL
THE TRIAL COURT
ATTORNEY'S FEES.

ERRED

IN AWARDING

BRUNO

In its Memorandum of Costs (R, 2241 at 2242), Bruno included
a claim for attorney' s fees paid to an Oregon law firm of Dwyer,
Simpson & Waldo in connection with the deposition of Michael
Graham.

Eryck objected to the inclusion of this item as a cost.

(R. 2283 at 2287.)

The Court awarded the attorney's

fees as

costs.
There is

no authority

in this

state which would

permit

Bruno to recover any attorney' s fees in connection with this
action.

Indeed, the trial court had a duty to guard against any

excesses or abuses in the taxing of costs.
605 P. 2d 771 at 774 (Utah 1980).
disallowed the attorney's fees.

Frampton v. Wilson.

The trial court should have

The judgment for costs should be

reduced by the principal amount of $368. 75.

For the foregoing reasons, the Order and Decree of the court
dated March 9,

1990 should be reversed and all of the seized

property should be returned to Eryck Aston.
DATED this 27th day of December, 1990.

Keith W. Meade
Attorney for Appellant

14

This Appendix is filed by Eryck Aston in support of his
contention that even apart from the effect of the reversal of the
Divorce Decree, the trial court committed reversible error.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In addition to the issues set forth in the main Brief, the
following additional issues are presently on appeal:
1.
proof-

The trial

court

did

no apply the proper burden of

This error, coupled with errors on pivotail findings of

fact and the admission of evidence, mandate reversal of the Order
and Decree.

As to the issues of law, the standard of review is

for correctness.
1990).

Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P. 2d 587 (Utah

As to the fact issues, the standard for review is whether

or not the findings of fact are clearly erroneous.

Sweeny v.

Kimball. 786 P. 2d 760 (Utah 1990).
2.

The district court erred in applying principles of res

judicata and collateral estoppel to refuse evidence regarding the
ownership of consigned and other property included in the Decree
of Divorce.

This issue is one of law.

for correctness.
3.

Even

The standard of review is

Brinkerhoff. supra.
if

the

trial

court's

Decree

and

Order

are

otherwise correct, the judgment and subsequent distribution of
the

property

was

inconsistent

with

the

trial

court' s

own

decision, and the matter should be remanded for reconsideration.
This issue is one of law and fact.

The standard for review is as

set forth in paragraph 1 above.
4.
post

The trial court erred in refusing to require Bruno to

a bond

to

hold

the property
18

pending

the January,

1990

hearing.

In addition, the trial court erred in establishing the

supersedeas bond subsequent to its March 9,
issues

are

correctness.

ones

of

law.

Brinkerhoff

The
v.

standard

Schwendiman.

1990 Order.
of

review

The

is

790 P. 2d 587

for
(Utah

1990).
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
No statutes or constitutional provisions are determinative
of these additional issues on appeal.

The additional issues

discussed in Point IV involve Rule 64, U. R. C. P. and Article 1,
§7, Constitution of Utah, both of which are attached.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following additional facts were proven at trial:
1.

Eryck Aston got his start in the coin business

by

traveling to coin shows with his father, Bruno, on an average of
about

once

a month.

He acquired

the nickname

of

"The Ten

Percenter" because he earned a 10% commission on any merchandise
he sold

for his

father at the shows.

(T.

344,

345. )

occasion, his father would pay the commission with coins.

On
Any

money that Eryck earned on his 10% commission he put back into
coins.

(T. 345. )

In addition, over the years, Bruno gave his

son coins for birthdays and Christmas.
his

(T. 345. )

On occasion

father would give Eryck one or two tables at a show to

display Eryck' s coins.

(T. 346. )

Eryck and his father had

business cards showing both of their names.
2.
in 1975.

(Exhibit 45.)

Eryck Aston first began collecting and dealing in coins
He has been a member of the Professional Coin Grading
19

Services, a national organization, and a lifetime member of the
American Numismatic Association since 1975.

Eryck Aston is a

member of the National Silver Dollar Roundtable, a national " by
invitation only" society.
3.

Prior to his parent' s divorce, Eryck and his father got

along fairly well.
4.

(T. 341. )

(T. 346. )

Eryck' s specialty was Canadian and U. S. silver dollars.

Eryck built his Canadian collection from the time he started in
coins.

Eryck also purchased Canadian coins at some of the shows

with his father' s assistance.
5.
1989.

(T. 346, 347. )

Eryck Aston opened his commercial store in January of
In order to get in a position to have the inventory that

was located in the store, Eryck took items on consignment.
borrowed money.

He bought and sold cars at a car lot.

He

He had

done coin shows over a period of time during which he sold his
better coins and used the proceeds to buy less expensive coins
that would be more saleable to walk-in business traffic.

He put

his gun collection and basically everything that he owned in the
store on display.
6.

(T. 353. )

At the trial, Eryck Aston presented original invoices

for the purchase of hundreds of coins, many of which remained in
his inventory at the store and were seized by the constable.
Those invoices were introduced at trial as Exhibit 41.
7.

Bruno Aston claims that Eryck Aston obtained possession

of the items which were seized from his store by taking them from

20

Bruno's

car

and

motorhome

in April

of

1986.

Eryck

testified that he never took anything from his father.
8.

Aston

(T. 340. )

Bruno Aston testified that he marked his most valuable

coins by stamping the coins on the rim at the top of the coin
with a small "A."

(T. 64. )

Thirteen of the coins which were

seized from The Gold Connection were coins bearing the stamped
letters."
9.
his

(F. F. 18, R. 2370.)

Eryck testified that many of the coins that he had in

collection had an "A"

either purchased
father.
10.

stamped

on them because they were

from his father or were given to him by his

(T. 350. )
Bruno testified

that at one time or another he had

owned every coin ever minted in the United States.

He testified

further that he had stamped some of his most valuable coins for
many years.

(T. 64. )

In the divorce trial between Dorothy and

Bruno, Bruno testified that he had given coins to Eryck bearing
his stamped "A" on them, (T. 301).

Bruno also testified at that

trial that he "absolutely" sold coins bearing his stamped "A,"
(T. 301) and that on occasion he gave some of his "finest" coins
to Dorothy in exchange for cash.

(T. 229-230. )

At the hearing

between Eryck and Bruno, Bruno changed his testimony and denied
having ever parted with any coins bearing the "A."
11.

(T. 188. )

Mr. Gary Fernandez, a dealer from California, testified

that he had seen coins bearing Bruno's stamped "A" as part of
Barbara Goldfried' s collection.
collector in California.

Barbara Goldfried was a coin

(T. 352. )
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Bruno, who had worked with

Goldfried, never denied that Barbara Goldfried had coins in her
collection bearing his "A."
12.

During the course of the trial, Bruno acknowledged that

with respect to the coins which were before the Court that "apart
from the "A," could be mine, could be not, "
13.

Bruno

Aston

testified

that

he

bullion coins that were before the Court.
14.

(T. 217. )
could

recognize

the

(T. 85. )

With respect to the coins listed in the inventory of

coins taken from Eryck's store (Exhibit 7), Bruno testified in
part as follows:
(a)

With respect to the coins on pages 2, 3 and 4,

that those coins were "not identifiable, unless they are great
rarities, of course" and that there were no rarities on those
pages.

(T. 204, 205. )
(b)

That the coins on pages 5 and 6 of the inventory

were not identifiable by him as having been his coins.

(T. 206,

207. )
(c)

With respect to the gold coins on page 8, that

they are fairly common and "they could be anybody's.
way to identify, to say they are mine . . . "
(d)

With

respect to the coins

I have no

(T. 211. )
on page

8(b), Bruno

agreed that there were no high quality coins there and that every
coin shop in the country had some of those.
(e)

With

respect

(T. 215. )

to peace dollars,

(page

8(b)) he

agreed that apart from coins that had his stamped "A" on them,
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there was

no way that he could tell whether the coin had ever

been in his possession,
(f)
12(b),

With

(T. 217).

respect

to the

gold

pieces

listed

on

page

that they were common and that he could not say whether

they were his or anyone else1 s.
(g)

(T. 221. )

There was no testimony by Bruno that any of the

other silver dollars were either BU

(brilliant uncirculated) or

CIRC (circulated) dollars, or that they had been included in the
rolls

of

BU

coins

were,

or CIRC

coins

nevertheless,

Bruno
awarded

claimed were missing.
to Bruno.

(Cf.

These

Findings

of

Fact 19, p. 6. )
15.

During the course of the hearing, Bruno Aston presented

no testimony other than his own to support his ownership of the
personal property seized from The Gold Connection.
16.

Al

Rust,

a coin expert

from Salt

Lake City,

who had

been in the coin business in excess of 20 years at the time of
hearing, testified as an expert witness as follows:
(a)

That he did not know Eryck Aston.

(b)

That

the

silver

dollars

which

(T. 454.)
were

before

the

court were just about impossible to identify as having ever been
in Bruno's possession.
type of material. "
(c)
the

coins

another.

"Every coin store would have that same

(T. 455. )

That as a general rule he would have nearly all of

which

had

been seized

in his store in one grade

or

While he didn't have the metric dollar (1879) on hand,

he did not consider it unique.

(T. 456. )
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(d)

Mr. Rust testified that perhaps the most unusual

coin was the metric dollar.
61.

He graded it at probably an MS60 or

He stated that the value of the coin, based on then-current

publications, was about $2, 850. 00.

Bruno Aston had valued the

metric coin which he claimed was taken from him at $12,500.00.
(T. 460, 461; R. 2265. )
(e)

Mr. Rust testified that he had examined the coins

of the American West that Bruno claimed were part of a set.

Mr.

Rust testified that the coins before the court were not original
coins having the $30,000. 00 value claimed by Bruno as having been
stolen, but were instead
value.

fantasy

coins having a very nominal

(T. 461. )
(f)

Mr. Rust testified extensively from the list of

coins seized from Eryck Aston' s store and testified that without
exception the coins were common, of relatively low value, and
were readily available in coin stores.
(g)

(T. 462-472.)

Mr. Rust testified that one distinguishing factor

of coins was their grade.

During the course of his testimony,

Mr. Rust testified that the coins before the court were not of a
high grade and certainly not of the grade that Bruno
claimed had been taken.

(T. 460-475. )

D'Aston

(Bruno offered no expert

testimony, and in most instances, no testimony at all, as to the
grade of the coins. )
(h)

Mr. Rust testified that with "most coins it's just

about impossible to identify. "

(T. 491. )
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(i)

With respect to the coins which had been stamped

with the letter A, Mr. Rust made the following analogy:
If I had a hundred dollar bill and I put my
name on it, Alvin Rust, and I take the serial
number down, and I have all that information,
and I own that hundred dollar bill and then
it' s taken by someone and it' s spent and it' s
at the bank and I see my name on the hundred
dollar bill, will the bank give me that
hundred dollar bill because my name is on it
and I have the number down that that' s my
bill?
No, they will not because they have
possession of it and it' s their money. That
A only shows he had title to it when it' s in
his possession.
When it' s out of his
possession, that doesn' t give him title to
it. That' s my opinion.
(T. 495. )
(j)

That the odd sized silver bars before the court

were bought and sold all the time.
that

the

Mexican

Libertads

basically bullion coins.
17.

Mr. Rust testified further

that were before

the

court were

(T. 457. )

During the course of the hearing, Eryck testified as to

the source of each item of personal property which was seized by
the Constable.

A summary of Eryck Aston' s testimony is set forth

at defendant' s Exhibit 49.
18.

As part of its Memorandum Decision, the court stated

that there was a "lack of truthfulness which was apparent in the
testimony of both parties. "

(R. 2338. )

The Court stated that

"the plaintiff's later inventories do not appear to have the same
reliability as the original (police) report."
police report was Exhibit 57. )

(R. 2339.)

(The

Judge Harding ruled that items

not listed by Bruno on the original police report list (Divorce
25

Trial Exhibit 161) were to be awarded to Eryck,
2240. )

(R. 2239 and

In spite of this decision and Order, and without any

subsequent hearing being permitted,

the trial

court proceeded

without explanation to award a vast majority of the items not
listed in the police report to Bruno.

(See Order dated July 9,

1990, bearing Judge Harding' s signature stamped by the bailiff at
a time when Judge Harding was and had been on vacation. )

(R.

2526. )
19.

Subsequent

to

the

entry

of

the

court' s Order

and

Decree, the court has permitted no oral argument on any motions
respecting the distribution of the seized property.
instances, it has entered no ruling whatsoever.

In most

(R. 2441, other

motions were not yet included in the record on app€*al. )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The only testimony introduced at the trial by Bruno on

the issue of his ownership of the coins and other property seized
was his own testimony.
the seized property
Small, infra.

Bruno was required to prove that he owned
"with reasonable

certainty."

Burgess v.

There were two types of coins seized from Eryck:

i) 13 coins which were stamped with an "A," and ii) all other
coins.

Regarding the "A" stamped coins, Bruno testified in the

divorce trial that he had traded and sold those coins to others
and given some of those coins to Eryck.

Bruno' s testimony in

this hearing was directly contrary to his prior testimony.
trial

court

found

in

its

testimony was not credible.

Memorandum

Decision

(R. 2238. )
26

that

The

Bruno' s

With respect to the

other

coins,

Bruno' s

identifiable.

testimony

was

that

they

were

not

As a result, the evidence introduced by Bruno was

insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his "with reasonable
certainty" burden of proof.
2.

In the divorce proceedings between Bruno and Dorothy,

the District Court (Judge Park) made no determination regarding
the ownership of the property listed in the numerous exhibits to
the Decree.
listed

The divorce court awarded 70% of the value of the

property,

Dorothy.

The

if

and

divorce

when

located,

court

very

to Bruno

carefully

and

30% to

avoided

any

determination that any of the listed property had been or was
owned

by

any

of

the

parties.

The

determination that the "consigned"
Bruno.

In subsequent

divorce

court

made

no

coins were the property of

proceedings,

the District

Court

(Judge

Harding) erred by ruling that it would "hear no testimony on the
issue of whether or not the consigned coins are the property of
the plaintiff [Bruno] as that issue was decided by [the divorce
court]."

(T. 2. ) The District Court's application of principles

of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the proceeding between
Bruno

and

Eryck

was

error

because

the

issues

had

not

been

determined in the divorce proceedings and the divorce proceedings
have now been reversed, so that there is no final judgment upon
which to base res judicata.
3.

Subsequent

proceeding
finding

the

that

to

District

the only

the

evidentiary

Court

entered

hearing

a Memorandum

credible list of coins
27

in

this

Decision

that Bruno had

prepared was the list which he gave to the police in 1986.

The

District Court awarded Bruno only coins which matched that list.
In subsequent orders prepared and submitted by counsel for Bruno,
many additional items of property and coins were included which
were not included on the police list.

There is no findings of

fact or other basis in the record which would have permitted the
trial court to include those additional items in its subsequent
orders

releasing

property

to Bruno.

The inclusion

of those

additional items was reversible error.
4.

Prior to the evidentiary hearing, all of the coins and

property

seized

hearing.

from Eryck was held without bond and without

This conduct was a violation of Eryck' s constitutional

right of due process, Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution,
and

of

the

Procedure.
court

requirements
Subsequent

required

a

of

Rule

64,

Utah

to the evidentiary

supersedeas

bond

of

Rules

hearing,

of

Civil

the trial

$150,000.00.

This

requirement was established at a time when the only evidence in
the record on the value of the coins which had been awarded to
Bruno

was

$31,000.00.

that

the

value

of

those

coins

did

not

exceed

There was also undisputed evidence in the record at

that time that the value of those coins was unlikely to change
during the pendency of the appeal.
the

supersedeas

bond

at

the

The court' s establishment of

amount

of

$150,000.00

supported by any evidence in the record and was error.
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was

not

ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT

POINT It
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SATISFY

B R W O ' S gVRPSH OF PROOF AMP TO SUPPORT
PIVQTAL FlNQlNgg QF THE TRIAL COURT,
It is Eryck Aston' s principle contention that this matter
should be reversed for the reasons set forth in the main Brief.
However, if this Court should determine that the hearing which is
the

subject

of

this

appeal

was

a plenary

proceeding,

not

reversible purely as a matter of law, the following discussion
addresses additional errors which warrant reversal.
If the hearing was a plenary proceeding (which it was not),
Bruno Aston was obligated to prove his title to each item of
property seized from Eryck "with reasonable certainty."
v. Small. 117 A. 2d 344 (Me. 1955).
"absence of doubt."
proceeded

Burgess

"Reasonable certainty" means

Blacks Law Diet. , 4th Ed.

If Bruno's claim

on a plenary basis, he was obligated

to prove his

ownership based upon the strength of his own evidence, and not
based

on

Eryck' s inability

to prove

ownership.

Eaaert v.

Vincent. 723 P. 2d 527 (Wash. 1986).
There were two types of coins at issue in this litigation:
a) those bearing an "A" stamped on the rim, and b) all of the
other coins and bullion.
A.

"A" Stamped Coins.

As to the coins bearing the stamped "A," Eryck claimed that
the 13 "A" stamped coins had been given to him as gifts by his
father over the years.

Bruno, on the other hand, testified that
29

he had never given Eryck any coins bearing the stamped "A" and
that he had never parted with any coins bearing the stamped "A. "
(T. 350, 188. )
However,

at the divorce trial between Bruno and Dorothy,

Bruno testified to the direct contrary about the stamped coins.
For example, Bruno testified at the divorce trial that he gave
Eryck coins bearing the stamped "A" (Divorce T. 301); that he had
"absolutely"
(Divorce

T.

sold
301).

coins

bearing

the

stamped

"A"

to

Bruno testified that he stamped

others

his most

valuable coins (T. 64) and testified in both proceedings that he
had given some of his "finest" coins to Dorothy in exchange for
cash (Divorce T. 148, 302).
Bruno' s testimony in this hearing was the only affirmative
evidence in support of the - rial court' s finding that the "A"
stamped coins taken from Eryc) were Bruno' s.

Bruno' s testimony

must be considered in light of i) the court's own statement that
the testimony of Bruno was letis than credible
Bruno' s changed

testimony,

iii

(R. 2238),

Bruno' s admission

ii)

during

the

course of the hearing that he had misrepresented the Al Schafer
consignment to Judge Park to avoid having to account to Dorothy
for

those

Fernandez

coins

(T.

264,

265); iv) the

testimony

of

Gary

(a coin dealer from California) that he had seen the

"A" stamped coins in the possession of others and that he (Gary
Fernandez) in fact had "A" stamped coins in his possession at the
time of the hearing (T. 302, 303); and v) Anthony Calcogno's (a
California dealer) testimony that Barbara Goldfried (a California
30

collector) had coins in her collection with the stamped "A."
352. )

(T.

Bruno never denied that Goldfried had "A" stamped coins in

her collection.
Bruno had the burden to prove ownership of the seized coins.
Buraess

v.

Smal1,

supra.

Given Bruno' s recognized

lack of

credibility, Bruno' s about face testimony and the total absence
of any corroborating testimony, the evidence which was before the
trial court could not, as a matter of law, permit it to reach the
conclusion that the "A" stamped coins seized from Eryck were,
with reasonable certainty, Bruno' s.

iL

gyvno' ? evidence on tfre balance oi the coins was

AnSUfficinSnt t o megt hig fryrflen QJ proo£ t
With r e s p e c t

to

all

of

the

unstamped m a t e r i a l ,

Bruno had

t h e burden of proving ownership "with r e a s o n a b l e c e r t a i n t y . "
could

not

ownership.

rely

on

Burgess,

On d i r e c t

Eryck' s

or

failure

to

prove

gyipya; Ecrcrert. ££££&.

examination,

h i s own c o u n s e l ,

inability

He

i n response t o q u e s t i o n s

framed by

Bruno claimed ownership of v i r t u a l l y e v e r y item

which had been s e i z e d .
However,
acknowledged

on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ,
that

he

could

not

when p r e s s e d ,
identify

items as having e v e r been i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n .

the

Bruno

unmarked

finally
seized

For example:

T. 183

Bruno t e s t i f i e d t h a t b u l l i o n was
not i d e n t i f i a b l e ;

T. 204

Circulated dollars
are
not
identifiable,
unless
great
rarities;

31

T. 210

"How can I tell one
Gaudin from another?"

1908 St.

T. 217

While talking about the peace
dollars - "Apart from the A could
be mine, could be not . . . . "

If the testimony of Eryck is excluded altogether on this
subject, there remains the unopposed (by any other expert) expert
testimony of Al Rust, a well-known Salt Lake City coin dealer,
that none of the coins before the court were unusual, that the
silver dollars that were seized were just about impossible to
identify

on

an

individual

basis,

that

the

bullion

was

not

identifiable, that many coins similar to those which had been
seized were available in Mr. Rust' s own store, and that all of
the coins could be readily obtained in a relatively short time
even if they were

not

on hand.

(T.

455,

456. )

Even the

allegedly unique 1879-S metric pattern dollar (which Bruno had
never

previously

listed

as

having

owned) was

purchase through recognized trade publications
$2, 850. 00.

available

for

for the sum of

(T. 460. )

Bruno had the burden of proving ownership of the seized
materials.
supra.
his

Eryck was not obligated to prove ownership.

Eaaert.

The version of the facts most favorable to Bruno would be

own

testimony.

ownership of each item.

On

direct

examination,

Bruno

claimed

On cross examination, even Bruno agreed

that, with the exception of great rarities and the stamped
the coins were not identifiable. (T. 183, 204, 210, 217)

"A,"
(Bruno

did not point to any great rarities, except possibly the 1879
metric. )
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Bruno simply did not meet his burden of proof.
itself

stated

that

it

could

aspects of its findings.

only

"reasonably

The Court

infer"

(F. F. 14, 15, R. 2319.)

certain

The standard

of "reasonably infer" is on its face, much less than the burden
of proving with "reasonable certainty. "The court's "finding" that
the "plaintiff has met his burden of proving ownership of many of
the items . . . "

(R. 2319, F. F. 18) is not a finding, but a

conclusion unsupported even by Bruno' s testimony.
"clearly erroneous."

The finding is

The findings which flow from it, Findings

19 and 21 (R. 2320), are clearly erroneous for the same reason.
£L

Additional pivotal findings are clearly erroneous.

In Finding of Fact No. 7, R. 2318, the Court stated that:
Some of those items, while not exceptionally
rare, would not be expected to appear in an
average coin shop.
This finding is wholly unsupported by the record.

There was

no evidence at trial from any coin shop owner other than Eryck
Aston and Alvin Rust.

Mr. Rust testified that the coins were

not unusual, that he had many of the same coins at his shop and
that the others could be readily obtained.

(T. 455, 456, 460,

461. )
EL

Conclusion.

The

cumulative

significant.

This

effect
case was

of

each

one where

of

these

there was

evidence that any coins had been taken from Bruno.

errors

is

no direct
The trial

court obviously reached its ultimate conclusion that it could
"reasonably infer" certain things based upon assumptions which it
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made.

As discussed herein, many of those assumptions are not

supported by the record and are contrary to the burden of proof
and standard of evidence to be applied.

The appellant' s burden

with respect to findings of fact is to demonstrate that they are
"clearly erroneous."
erroneous. "

The findings discussed above are "clearly

With respect to the Court's

conclusions

of law,

those are matters upon this Court is entitled to substitute its
judgment based upon the findings of fact.

The trial court's

ultimate conclusion that the listed coins belonged to Bruno is
not sustainable in the absence of the findings of fact discussed
above and in light of the burden of proof which existed.

POINT I L
THE DISTRICT COVRT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
BY fiSFVglNg TQ APMIT EYIPENCE RECARPINC
QQNglgNMENTg AND OWNERSHIP QF OTHER
PRQPSRTY,
The divorce proceeding between Bruno and Dorothy was very
unusual because Bruno joined his two children
Lisa

and

Eryck,

as

co-defendants.

between Bruno and Dorothy.
District

Court

included

Lisa and Eryck.

The divorce

dispute was

As part of the Divorce Decree, the
numerous

exhibits

listing

items

of

personal property which it awarded to Bruno, allowing Dorothy an
undivided interest in a percentage thereof.

There was no issue

in the divorce proceeding about who owned what.
issues

tried

between

Eryck

and

Bruno

There were no

regarding

any

of

the

property listed in the Exhibits to the Decree.
At the outset of these proceedings between Bruno and Eryck,
Judge Harding ruled that "the court will hear no testimony on the
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issue of whether or not the consigned coins are the property of
the plaintiff as that issue was decided by Judge Park. "

(T. 2. )

Judge Harding stated in an Order (R. 2315) that "ownership of
those consigned items and any obligations that go with them is
not the subject of this

action, "

During the course of the

trial, Judge Harding excluded the testimony of Michael Graham,
the purported

consignor to Bruno of a considerable number of

coins, and limited the admission of his deposition solely to use
for the purpose of attacking the credibility of Bruno Aston-

(T.

499. )
A review of the Decree of Divorce reflects that Judge Park
carefully avoided any determination as to whether or not a) coins
had been taken from Bruno by Dorothy or Eryck, and b) whether or
not a consignment of coins had actually occurred.

For example,

in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of his Memorandum Decision (R. 444
and 445), Judge Park states that allegations have been made but
makes no findings that any theft or misappropriation occurred.
In paragraph 20 of his Memorandum Decision (R. 452), Judge Park
stated that in the event the allegedly stolen coins were found to
be in the possession of Dorothy, Eryck or Bruno, that possession
would be considered contempt of the court.
his

Memorandum

convinced

Decision,

Judge

Park stated

that the value attributed

stolen coins was realistic.

In paragraph 18 of
that he was

not

by Bruno to the alleged

It is apparent in these statements

that Judge Park clearly avoided any determination as to whether
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coins had been taken or whether a consignment had occurred.

The

court simply divided the value of all of the coins.
There was no dispute at the divorce trial between Bruno and
Eryck over the consigned coins and no reason to clispute whether
or not a consignment had occurred.
in the divorce proceedings
coins.

Certainly

There was no claim by Bruno

that the consigned coins were his

there was

no determination

in the

divorce

proceeding that coins which might be identical to those included
within the consignment lists were owned by Bruno.

And yet, in

this proceeding, Judge Harding assumed as a starting point that
the consignment lists were an incontestable basis of proof of
Bruno's ownership of similar coins.

(T. 2, R* 2315.)

And Judge

Harding refused to consider evidence to the contrary.
The doctrine of res judicata is comprised of
two branches:
Claim preclusion and
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.
Both branches are designed to protect
litigants from the burden of relitigating an
identical issue with the same party or his
privy and to promote judicial economy by
preventing needless litigation.
Smith £1
Smith, 793 P. 2d 407 (Utah App. 1990).
Both branches of the doctrine require that a final judgment
have been entered.

Smith, 793 P. 2d at 409.

In this action,

there is no final judgment in the divorce action, the Decree of
Divorce having been reversed.

In addition, there was never any

claim preclusion because the ownership of the consigned coins by
Bruno was never litigated in the Divorce Decree.

In fact, Judge

Park stated that anyone possessing them (even Bruno) would be in
contempt.

Eryck had no reason to believe at the time of the
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divorce that if he owned similar coins that the "consignment"
would later be used by Bruno as a sword to extricate those coins
from him.

And, most importantly/ there was no determination that

any consignment even occurred.
In the divorce proceedings, Bruno alleged that there were
two consignments.
Schafer.

The first consignment was allegedly from Al

During the hearing between Bruno and Eryck,

Bruno

candidly confessed that there was in fact no consignment from Al
Schafer to him,
actually his.

and then claimed that all of the coins were

(T. 264, 265. )

Prior to the hearing between Bruno and Eryck, the deposition
of Michael Graham was taken in Oregon, where Graham resided.
Graham testified in the deposition that he had never made any
consignment of coins to Bruno, that the invoices upon which the
consignment was purportedly written were not his invoices and
that

his

business

had

never

used

such

forms, and

that his

business had never had the type of coins or inventory in its
possession which Bruno contended had been consigned to him.

It

was this evidence that the trial court refused to consider.
(Graham7 s Depo. Trans, p. 31, 35, 38, 41, 45, 68; published.

R.

2214. )
The items which Bruno claimed by virtue of the consignment
are reflected in Exhibit 17, pages 2 and 3.
Bruno to consigned

Additional claims by

coins are set forth in Exhibit

handwritten notes under the column entitled "grade."
the

references

in Exhibits

15 and
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17 to Exhibit

15 in his
(Each of
24 is

to

consigned coins from Michael Graham, )

Furthermore, Exhibit 22

from the first trial includes the coins which were listed in the
alleged consignment documents.

For example, on page 5 and 6 of

Exhibit 22 (R. 524, 525) the Canadian coins listed match coin for
coin those contained on pages 3, 4 and 5 of Exhibit 24.
533. )

They are the same coins.

(R. 531-

Bruno7 s claims to the coins

listed on pages 4, 5 and part of page 6 of Exhibit 17 (from this
hearing) are also based on the "consignments."
The effect of Judge Harding' s refusal to consider evidence
on the consignments

was two-fold:

a) it permitted

Bruno to

establish ownership based solely on the Decree of Divorce, and b)
it barred Eryck from attacking the consignments which were the
sole basis for Bruno' s claim of ownership to many items.

Bruno' s

confession that the consignment from Al Schafer did not occur and
Judge Harding' s refusal to consider whether or not the Graham
consignment
whether

any

occurred

means

consignment

that no court has ever determined

ever

occurred.

If

no

consignments

occurred, Bruno offered no evidence to support a finding that he
owned the "consigned coins."
Judge Harding' s award of any consigned coins to Bruno should
be

reversed

for

several

reasons.

First,

the trial

court' s

reliance on collateral estoppel and res judicata was incorrect as
a matter of law.

Second, the trial court' s refusal to consider

evidence on whether or not a consignment had ever occurred denied
Eryck

a plenary

hearing on the issue.
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Third,

there was

no

evidence, apart from the court' s reliance on the reversed Decree,
to support a finding that Bruno owned the consigned coins.
POINT lilt
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

IN ITS INCLUSION OF CERTAIN ITEMS OF PROPERTY
IN THE DECREE AND POST-TRIAL ORDERS,
Subsequent to the time that the court entered its Memorandum
Decision and the time that the Decree and Order was entered in
this matter, the appellant filed post-trial motions objecting to
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to the
Order and Decree.

A hearing was had on those motions in early

March and by an Order dated

March 9, 1990# the court denied

Eryck' s post-trial motions.

Also on March 9, 1990, the trial

court entered its Order and Decree (R.

2325).

The Order purports to award to Bruno many items of personal
property in excess of those described by the trial court in its
Memorandum

Decision

dated

January

31,

1990

(R.

2238).

The

Memorandum Decision determined that the most reliable evidence of
property

which

had

once

belonged

to Bruno was

the

original

inventory of allegedly stolen property which Bruno gave to the
police.

(That inventory is a part of the record in this action

as Exhibit 57. )
2325)

which

additional

was
items

However, in preparing the proposed Order (R.
ultimately
which

were

entered,
not

Bruno

contained

included
in

the

many
police

inventory, including the following:
h*.

An 18. 5 gram gold nugget.

The police inventory list

made no reference to gold nuggets of any type.
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(Exhibit 18. )

The only gold nugget referred to by Bruno in any list was an 84. 5
gram Alaska gold nugget referred to in Exhibit 30.
SL

84 common date BU-dollars (R. 2328) and 60 common date

CIRC-dollars (R. 2328).

There was absolutely no evidence before

the trial court to support any finding that the 84 common date BU
(brilliant uncirculated) and 60 common date CIRC

(circulated)

dollars listed in subsequent orders were included in the police
list (Exhibit 57).

In fact, Bruno's testimony was that this type

of coin - common dates - could not be identified.
206, 207, 211, 215. )

(T. 204, 205,

The trial court made no findings of fact

about these coins.
In

subsequent

orders

and

pleadings

prepared

extensive lists of these coins began to materialize.

by

Bruno,

(R. 2524,

2525), including gratuitous language that
"Note:
Eryck. »

No U.S. Dollars
(R. 2525. )

were

awarded

to

There was no basis in fact, in the court' s findings, in the
Memorandum Decision or in the record to support the inclusion of
such a statement in any order, or to support the inclusion of the
extensive lists of coins included in later orders.
2525. )

(See R. 2524,

The inclusion of these items in the Order to Deliver

Personal Property (R2522) represents overreaching on the part of
the plaintiff and is not supported by any evidence in the record.
C

The 1914-S 620 U.S. gold niece.

This coin (R. 2523)

was not included in the police list, but was erroneously included
in the Order and Decree.
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Ik

Consigned coins.

As discussed previously in Point II

of this Appendix, the inclusion of any "consigned" items in the
Order and Decree is error.
|L

1904-S U.S. 620 gold coin (H 2523),

This coin was not

included in the police inventory list.
There are no findings by the Court which would support the
inclusion of any of these items in any subsequent orders.

The

reasons for these errors probably lies in the failure of the
trial court to tie together its memorandum decision, the police
list

(Exhibit

57)

- which

the Court

found

to be

the only

credible list of coins prepared by Bruno - and its subsequent
Order

(R.

2517).

The Court allowed

no hearings

on Bryck' s

motions and objections and in fact, the Order to Deliver (R.
2517) was not even signed by the Judge, but stamped by a bailiff
while the Judge was on vacation.

It is very likely that the

trial court has never considered that these discrepancies exist.
For these
divided

the

reasons, the Orders

property

are

(R.

incorrect,

2325 and

2522) which

inconsistent

with

the

findings of fact, not supported by the record, and inconsistent
with the trial court' s own decision.

(R. 2238. )

The matter

should be remanded, the Court ordered to remove these items from
the Order to Deliver, and the items returned to Eryck.

POINT IV,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WITH RESPECT TO PRE-

ANP PQST-HEAEINq BONDS,
A.

Preliminary Proceedings.

of Execution.

This action arose from a Writ

When the seizure of property from Eryck occurred
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in April, 1989 there had been no prior determination that any of
the

items

Divorce.

seized

from

Eryck were included

in

the Decree

of

The trial court subsequently determined that many of

the items which were seized were not among items included in the
Decree of Divorce,
After the April/

1989 seizure occurred/

Eryck moved the

court to require Bruno to post a bond to protect his interest.
(R. 2069. )
Bruno

At no time prior to the issuance of the Writ did

or anyone

on his

behalf

ever

file an affidavit

which

contended that the items to be seized were items included in the
Decree of Divorce.
ex

parte

In effect/ the trial court granted Bruno an

pre-judgment

attachment

either a bond or an affidavit.

without

the requirement

of

Cf. Rule 64A, B and C, U. R. C. P.

In cases such as this where the ownership of property is
disputed and no judgment has been entered with respect to its
ownership/ property may not be held solely upon the demand of the
moving party without any requirement of prompt hearing or the
filing of a bond.

The relief which was granted to Bruno was a

taking of property without due process of law.

Article 1# §7#

Constitution of Utah; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. , 395 U.S.
337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.
T. Grantco, 94 S. Ct. 1985 (1974); and Bank of Enhraim v. Davis.
581 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1978).
The unconstitutionality of the Writ is further highlighted
by the fact that it required the constable to assume that any
coin or object fitting a certain description belonged to the
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plaintiff.

It was so vague that the constable was required to

guess what items of property were to be seized.
The trial court' s failure to allow a prompt hearing or to
require

a bond,

violated

Eryck' s

fundamental

rights

of due

process.

B.

The trial court erred in fixing the supersedeas bond»

Subsequent to the trial and after the appeal had been filed,
Eryck filed a motion in the district court requesting that the
court establish a supersedeas bond to hold the property in place
during the pendency of the appeal.

(R. 2335. )

At this time, the

property had already been held by the court for approximately one
year without any bond having been posted by Bruno.

(R. 2335. )

In support of his motion, Eryck filed an affidavit setting forth
his opinion that the value of the coins awarded to his father by
the Order and Decree did not exceed $31,000.00 in value.

In

response to the motion, Bruno filed no timely affidavit on the
value of the property.

At the hearing on May 4, 1990, the trial

court struck the affidavit of Bruno Aston which contended that
there was some higher value attributable to the coins which had
been awarded to him.

(R. 2417. )

There had been no evidence

during the course of the hearing on the value of the property.
At the time of the hearing, the only evidence before the court
with respect to the value of the coins awarded to Bruno was
Eryck's affidavit.

(R. 2363.)

At oral argument, Eryck contended that the bond should be
established based upon any change in value which might occur
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during the pendency of the appeal, but in no event should the
bond be greater than the value of the property which had been
awarded to Bruno ($31,000.00).
In its Order, the court directed Eryck to post a corporate
surety bond in the amount of $150,000.00 to obtain a stay.

(R.

2418. )
The

standard

discretion.

for

review

on this

issue

is

for abuse

of

Eryck contends that the court abused its discretion

in establishing the supersedeas bond for the following reasons:
a.

There was no evidence before the court on the

value of the property other than Eryck' s affidavit that
the property was worth $31,000.00;
b.

There was no evidence before the court that

the change in value of the property during the pendency
of the appeal would exceed the value of the property.
In effect, the court pulled its $150,000.00 figure out
of thin air.
The correct

measure

for the court to have considered in

establishing the bo ad was the change in value of the property
during the pendency of the appeal.
§1058.

5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error.

The court's conduct in establishing a bond in an amount

approximately

five times the value of the property awarded to

plaintiff was, under the circumstances, an abuse of discretion.
The point of the foregoing discussion is that if this matter
should be remanded (and not reversed), Bruno should be required
to both i) redeliver the property which has now been given to him
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by the Clerk, and ii) post a bond to hold the property in the
Court pending further proceedings in the district court.

And if

the matter should come up on appeal again, the supersedeas bond
should not exceed the value of property being held.

CONCISION
For these additional

reasons, the Order and Decree dated

March 9, 1990 (R. 2325) should be reversed with all of the seized
property being returned to Eryck. .
minimum,

the

matter

should

be

In the alternative, and at a
remanded

conforming the Order for Delivery

for the

of

(R. 2522) with the court' s

decision (R. 2238) and for further proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of December, 1990.

Keith W. Meade
Attorney for Appellant
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PART VTIL
PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS,
Rule 64A. Prejudgment writs of replevin, attachment and garnishment.
Prejudgment writs of replevin, attachment and
garnishment may be issued under the following conditions and circumstances:
(1) The writ shall issue only upon written motion and pursuant to a written order of the court.
(2) The court shall not direct the issuance of
the writ without notice to the adverse party and
an opportunity to be heard unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by
the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the
applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.
(3) Every order authorizing the issuance of the
writ granted without notice shall be endorsed
with the date and hour of issuance and shall be
filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of
record. It shall define the injury and state why it
is irreparable and why it was granted without
notice. Such order, and any writ issued pursuant
thereto, shall expire by its terms within such
time after issuance, not to exceed ten days, as the
court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the
court shall, after notice and hearing, order the
writ continued in effect, or unless the adverse
party consents that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be
entered of record.
(4) If the writ is issued without notice, a hearing thereon shall be set for the earliest reasonable time.
(5) At the hearing on the issuance of the writ
or its continuance, the proponent for the writ
shall have the burden of establishing the facts
justifying its issuance and continuance.
(6) On two days' notice to the party obtaining
the issuance of a writ without notice, or on such
shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move
its dissolution or modification; and in that event
the court shall proceed to hear and determine
such motion, as expeditiously as possible.
(7) Any notice required under this rule shall
be in such form and served in such manner as
will expeditiously give the adverse party actual
notice of the proceeding, all as directed by the
court.
(8) In the event that property has been seized
by the sheriff pursuant to the issuance of a writ
without notice, such property shall be retained
by him, subject to the order of the court.
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(9) Except as herein provided, the provisions of
Rules 64B, 64C and 64D shall continue to be and
remain in full force and effect.
Rule 64B. Replevin.
(a) Possession of personal property pending
action. Except as provided in Rule 64A and as authorized and permitted therein, the plaintiff in an action
to recover the possession of personal property may,
after the filing of the complaint and at any time before judgment, claim the delivery of such property to
him as provided in this rule.
(b) Affidavit. When delivery is claimed, the plaintiff shall file with the court an affidavit, showing: (1)
a description of the property claimed; (2) that the
plaintiff is the owner of the property or has a special
ownership or interest therein, stating the facts in relation thereto, and that he is entitled to the possession thereof; (3) that the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party; (4) the alleged cause of
the detention thereof according to the best knowledge, information and belief of affiant; (5) that it has
not been taken for a tax, assessment or fine pursuant
to a statute, or seized under an execution or an attachment against the property of the plaintiff; or if so
seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure;
(6) the actual value of the property.
(c) Undertaking; issuance of writ; service.
Upon the filing of the affidavit, together with an undertaking with sufficient sureties to the effect that
they are bound to the defendant in double the value
of the property, as stated in the affidavit, for the prosecution of the action, for the return of the property to
the defendant, if return thereof be adjudged, and for
the payment to him of such sum as may from any
cause be recovered against the plaintiff, the clerk of
the court shall issue a writ requiring the sheriff or
constable forthwith to take the property described in
the affidavit and retain it in his custody until delivery as hereinafter provided. The sheriff or constable
shall forthwith execute the writ and without delay
shall serve on the defendant a copy of the affidavit,
undertaking and writ; provided that if service cannot
be made upon the defendant as provided for the service of process, such service shall be made by placing
a copy of such papers in an envelope postage prepaid
and addressed to the defendant at his last known address, and depositing the same in the nearest post
office.
(d) Exception to sureties; justification. The defendant may, within two days after the service of a
copy of the writ, serve and file a notice that he excepts to the sufficiency of the sureties. If he fails to do
so, he is deemed to have waived all objections to
them. When the defendant excepts, the sureties must
justify on notice to the defendant within five days, in
the same manner as upon undertakings on attachment, and if they fail to justify within such time, the
property shall be returned to the defendant; provided
that the court may allow the giving of amended or
additional undertakings required by this rule. If the
defendant excepts to the sureties, he cannot reclaim
the property, as provided in the next succeeding subdivision.
(e) Redelivery of property; undertaking. At any
time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff the defendant may, if he does not except to the
sufficiency of plaintiffs sureties, require the return of
such property by serving upon the sheriff and the
plaintiff and filing with the court a written undertaking with sufficient sureties to the effect that they are
bound in double the value of the property as stated in
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the affidavit of the plaintiff, for the delivery thereof
to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and for
the payment to him of such sum as may for any cause
be recovered against the defendant. The undertaking,
and the undertaking required by Subdivision (c) of
this rule, shall further provide that each surety submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as his agent
upon whom any papers affecting his liability on the
undertaking may be served, and that his liability
may be enforced on motion and on such notice as the
court may prescribe without the necessity of an independent action.
(f) Justification of defendant's sureties. The
plaintiff may, within two days after notice of the giving of the undertaking required in the next preceding
subdivision, serve upon the defendant and the sheriff
and file with the court a notice that he excepts to the
sufficiency of the sureties. The sheriff shall thereupon
hold the property in his possession until action upon
such exception to the sureties. Justification of defendant's sureties shall be made in accordance with the
provisions of Subdivision (d) of this rule.
(g) Delivery of property. Subject to the provisions of Rule 64A(8), if a return of the property is not
required by the defendant within two days after the
taking and service of the writ upon him, or if redelivery is required but defendant's sureties fail to justify
and no amended or additional undertaking is given,
the property must he delivered to the plaintiff, except
as provided in Subdivision (i). If the defendant requires the redelivery of the property, and the plaintiff
fails to except to defendant's sureties within two
days, or upon the justification of defendant's sureties,
the sheriff shall redeliver the property to the defendant.
(h) Further powers and duties of sheriff and
constable.
(1) Taking of property by force. If the officer has probable cause to believe that the property or any part thereof is concealed or withheld
in a building or inclosure, the sheriff must publicly demand its delivery. If it is not delivered, he
must cause the building or inclosure to be broken
open and take the property into his possession,
and, if necessary, he may call to his aid the power
of the county.
(2) Disposition of property. When the officer
has taken the property in accordance with the
provisions of this rule, he shall keep it in a secure
place and deliver it to the party entitled thereto.
(3) Return of the sheriff or constable. The
officer must file the writ, together with a return
of his doings in the matter, with the court in
which the action is pending, within twenty days
after the original service thereof.
(i) Claim to property by third party. If the property taken is claimed by any person other than the
defendant or his agent, and such person makes affidavit of his title thereto, or of his right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such title or right, and
serves the same upon the officer, such officer is not
bound to keep the property or deliver it to the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff, on demand made on him,
indemnifies the officer against such claim by an undertaking with sufficient sureties in an amount not
less than double the value of the property.
Rule 64C. Attachment.
(a) When attachment may issue; affidavit. Except as provided in Rule 64A and as authorized and
permitted therein, the plaintiff, at any time after the
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filing of the complaint, in an action upon a judgment,
upon any contract express or implied, or in an action
against a nonresident of this state, may have the
property of the defendant, not exempt from execution,
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in such action, unless the
defendant gives security to pay such judgment as provided in Subdivision (f) of this rate, by fifing with the
court in which the action is pending an affidavit setting forth the following: That the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff, specifying the amount thereof
as near as may be over and above all legal setoffs and
the nature of the indebtedness; that the attachment
is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor
of the defendant; that the payment of the same has
not been secured by any mortgage or lien upon real or
personal property, situated or being in this state, or,
if originally so secured, that such security has, without any act of the plaintiff or the person to whom the
security was given, become impaired; and alleging,
but not in the alternative, any one or more of the
following causes for attachment:
(1) That the defendant is not a resident of this
state;
(2) That the defendant is, a foreign corporation, not qualified to do business in this state;
(3) That the defendant stands in defiance of an
officer, or conceals himself so that process cannot
be served upon him;
(4) That the defendant has assigned, disposed
of or concealed, or is about to assign, dispose of or
conceal, any of his property with intent to defraud his creditors;
(5) That the defendant has departed or is
about to depart from the state to the injury of his
creditors;
(6) That the defendant fraudulently contracted
the debt or incurred the obligation respecting
which the action is brought;
(7) Such other additional facts showing probable cause for being, and t h a t plaintiff is, justly
apprehensive of losing his claim unless a writ of
attachment issue.
(b) Undertaking; issuance of writ. The clerk
shall issue the writ of attachment upon the filing by
the plaintiff of the affidavit required by Subdivision
(a) of this rule, together with a written undertaking
on the part of the plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, in
a sum not less than double the amount claimed by the
plaintiff, but in no case shall an undertaking be required exceeding $10,000.00 or less than $50.00 in
amount. The conditions of such undertaking shall be
to the effect that if the defendant recovers judgment,
or if the attachment is wrongfully issued, the plaintiff
will pay all costs that may be awarded to the defendant and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, not exceeding the sum specified in the undertaking. Several writs may be issued
at the same time to the sheriffs of different counties;
and the plaintiff may have other writs of attachment
as often as he may require at any time before judgment, upon the original affidavit and undertaking, if
sufficient; provided, that writs governing personalty
only may be directed to a constable.
(c) Exception to sureties; justification. Within
five days after the levy of any attachment, the defendant may except to the sufficiency of the sureties, by
serving and filing a notice of such exception. Within
five days after such exception, the plaintiffs sureties,
upon notice to the defendant of not less than two
days, must justify before a judge of the court, or before the clerk thereof, and upon failure to justify, and
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if others in their places fail to justify, at the time and
place appointed, the clerk or judge shall dismiss the
writ of attachment.
(d) Contents of writ; how directed. The writ
must be issued in the name of the state of Utah and
shall be directed to the sheriff of any county in which
property of the defendant may be, and must require
him to attach and safety keep aff the property of such
defendant within his jurisdiction not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to
satisfy the plaintiffs demand, the amount of which
must be stated in conformity with the complaint, unless the defendant gives him an undertaking as provided for in Subdivision (f) of this rule; provided, t h a t
writs governing personalty only may be directed to a
constable.
(e) Manner of executing writ. The officer to
whom the writ is directed must execute the same
without delay, and, if the undertaking provided for in
Subdivision (f) of this rule is not given, as follows:
(1) Real property, standing upon the records of
the county in the name of the defendant, must be
attached by filing with the recorder of the county
a copy of the writ, together with a description of
the property attached, and a notice t h a t it is attached, and by leaving a similar copy of the wrjt,
description and notice with an occupant of the
property, if there is one, and if not, then by posting the same in a conspicuous place on the property attached.
(la) Growing crops (which, until severed, shall
be deemed personal property not capable of manual delivery), growing upon real property standing upon the records of the county in the name of
the defendant, must be attached by filing with
the recorder of the county a copy of the writ, together with a description of the growing crops to
be attached, and of the real property upon which
the same are growing, and a notice t h a t such
growing crops are attached in pursuance of the
writ, and by leaving a similar copy of the writ,
description and notice with an occupant of the
real property, if there is one, and if not, then by
posting the same in a conspicuous place on the
real property.
(2) Real property or an interest therein belonging to the defendant and held by any other
person, or standing on the records of the county
in the name of any other person, must be attached by filing with the recorder of the county a
copy of the writ, together with a description of
the property and a notice that such real property
and any interest of the defendant therein held by
or standing in the name of such other person,
naming him, are attached, and by leaving with
the occupant, if any, and with such other person
or his agent, if known and within the county, or
at the residence of either, if within the county, a
copy of the writ, with a similar description and
notice. If there is no occupant of the property, a
copy of the writ, together with such description
and notice, must be posted in a conspicuous place
upon the property. The recorder shall index such
attachment when filed, in the names both of the
defendant and the person by whom the property
is held, or in whose name it stands on the
records.
(2a) Growing crops (which, until severance,
shall be deemed personal property not capable of
manual delivery), or any interest therein belonging to the defendant, and growing upon real
property held by any other person or standing
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upon the records of the county in the name of any
Other person, must be attached in the same manner as crops growing upon real property standing
upon the records of the county in the name of the
defendant are attached by the provisions of Subparagraph (la) of this subdivision. The notice of
attachment shall state that the crops therein described or any interest of the defendant therein,
\ie\d by, or standing upon the records of t h e
county in the name of such other person (naming
him), are attached in pursuance of the writ. In
addition, a similar copy of the writ, description
and notice shall be delivered to such other person, or his agent, if known and within the county,
or left at the residence of either, if known and
within the county. The recorder must index such
attachment when filed in the names of both the
defendant and of the person by whom the real
property is held, or in whose name it stands on
the records.
(3) Personal property capable of manual delivery must be attached by taking it into custody,
except as provided in the next succeeding paragraph.
(4) Cattle, horses, sheep, and other livestock,
running at large and commonly known as range
stock, between the 1st day of November and the
next succeeding 15th day of May, must be attached by the sheriffs filing with the recorder of
the county in which such stock is running at
large a copy of the writ, together with a description of the property, specifying the number as
nearly as may be with marks and brands, if any,
and a notice t h a t such range stock are attached;
and such levy shall be as valid and effectual as if
such stock had been seized and the possession
and control thereof retained by the officer; provided t h a t an attachment may, by direction of
the plaintiff, be levied upon such range stock by
taking the same into custody; but if additional
costs are made by such levy, the same shall not
be allowed to the plaintiff, if in the judgment of
the court the taking of the property into the custody of the officer was unnecessary.
(5) Stocks or shares, or interest in stocks or
shares, of any corporation or company must be
attached by leaving with the president, secretary, cashier or other managing agent thereof, a
copy of the writ, and a notice stating that the
stock or interest of the defendant is attached in
pursuance of such writ and by taking the certificate into custody, unless the transfer thereof by
the holder is enjoined or unless it is surrendered
to the corporation issuing it.
(6) Debts and credits and other personal property not capable of manual delivery must be attached by leaving with the person owing such
debts, or having in his possession or under his
control such credits or other personal property, or
with his agent, a copy of the writ and a notice
t h a t the debts owing by him to the defendant, or
the credits or other personal property in his possession or under his control belonging to the defendant, are attached in pursuance of the writ.
(7) When there are several attachments
against the same defendant in different actions,
they shall be executed in the order in which they
are received by the officer.
(f) R e l e a s e of property o r d i s c h a r g e of attachment; undertaking required; justification of
sureties. At any time, either before or after the execution of the writ of attachment, the defendant may
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obtain a release of any property or a discharge of the
attachment, as follows:
(1) To secure a discharge of the attachment the
defendant shall furnish a bond, with sufficient
sureties, in a sum of not less than double the
amount claimed by the plaintiff, but not less
than $50.00 in amount. The conditions of such
undertaking shall be to the effect that if the
p\&\\rt,\ff YfctovftYs judgment, thfc defendant wi\\
pay the same, together with interest and all costs
assessed against him, not exceeding the sum
specified in the undertaking.
(2) To secure a release of property from the
attachment the defendant shall furnish a bond,
with sufficient sureties, in a sum not less than
the value of the property to be released, but in no
case in an amount greater than necessary to obtain a discharge of the attachment. The conditions of such undertaking shall be to the effect
that if the plaintiff recovers judgment, the defendant will pay the same, together with interest
and all costs assessed against him, not exceeding
the sum specified in the undertaking.
(3) The undertaking required by Subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision shall be
delivered to the sheriff or other officer having the
writ where the release or discharge is obtained at
or before the time of service of the attachment.
Where the release or discharge is sought after
the writ has been executed or the property attached, the defendant must apply to the court,
upon reasonable notice to the plaintiff, for an order releasing such property or discharging the
attachment. The undertaking required shall be
filed with the court, and a copy thereof served
upon the plaintiff. Within five days after notice
of the filing of the undertaking required by Subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision, plaintiff may except to the sufficiency of defendant's
sureties, by serving upon the defendant and filing with the court a notice of such exception.
Thereafter defendant's sureties, or others in their
stead, shall justify in the manner required for
justification of plaintiffs sureties under the provisions of Subdivision (c) of this rule. Upon a discharge of the attachment or release of the property, all of the property released, if not sold, and
the proceeds of any sale thereof, must be delivered to the defendant; provided that the release
or discharge by the court shall not be effective
until defendant's sureties have justified, or until
the time for plaintiffs exception thereto has expired.
(4) The defendant may also at any time, upon
such notice to the plaintiff as the court may require, make a motion to the court in which the
action is pending, to have the writ of attachment
discharged on the ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued; provided however,
that the court shall give the plaintiff reasonable
opportunity to correct any defect in the complaint, affidavit, bond, writ or other proceeding
so as to show that a legal cause for the attachment existed at the time it was issued.
(g) Liability of sureties to be set forth in undertaking. The undertaking required by Subdivisions
(b) and (0 of this rule shall, in addition to other requirements, provide that each surety submits himself
to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom
any papers affecting his liability on the undertaking
may be served, and that his liability may be enforced
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on motion and upon such notice as the court may
require without the necessity of an independent action.
(h) Return of sheriff; inventory of property.
The officer must return the writ of attachment to the
court within twenty days after its receipt, together
with a certificate of his proceedings endorsed thereon
or attached thereto. Such certificate shall contain a
full inventory of the property attached. To enable him
to make such return as to the debts and credits attached he must request, at the time of service, the
party owing the debts or having the credits to give
him a memorandum stating the amount and description of each; and if such memorandum is refused, the
officer must return the fact of refusal with the writ.
(i) Examination of defendant or third party.
The defendant may be required to attend before the
court or a master appointed by the court, to be examined on oath respecting his property. Any person owing debts to the defendant, or having in his possession
or under his control any credits or other personal
property belonging to the defendant, may likewise be
required to appear before the court or a master and be
examined respecting the same. The court or master,
after any examination conducted pursuant to this
subdivision, may order personal property capable of
manual delivery to be delivered to the officer, on such
terms as may be just, having reference to any liens
thereon or claims against the same, and may require
a memorandum to be given of all other personal property, containing the amount and description thereof.
The court may make such provision for witness fees
and mileage as may be just, provided that if any third
party has refused to give the officer executing the
writ a memorandum of any debts or credits, requested under the provisions of Subdivision (h) of this
rule, such party may be required to pay the costs of
any proceeding taken for the purpose of obtaining
such information.
(j) Sale of a t t a c h e d p r o p e r t y before j u d g m e n t .
(1) Where p r o p e r t y is p e r i s h a b l e . If any of
the property attached is perishable, the officer
must sell the same in the manner in which such
property is sold on execution. The proceeds and
other property attached by him must be retained
by him to answer any judgment that may be recovered in the action, unless released or discharged, or subjected to execution upon another
judgment recovered previous to issuing the attachment.
(2) Other property. Whenever property has
been taken by an officer under a writ of attachment, and it is made to appear satisfactorily to
the court that the interest of the parties to the
action will be subserved by a sale thereof, the
court may order such property sold in the same
manner as property sold under an execution, and
the proceeds to be deposited in the court to abide
the judgment in the action. Such order can be
made only upon notice to the adverse party, in
case such party has been personally served in the
action.
(k) Satisfaction of judgment; deficiency; redelivery of property. If judgment is recovered by the
plaintiff, the officer must satisfy the same out of the
property attached by him which has not been delivered to the defendant or a claimant as herein provided, or subjected to a prior lien, if it is sufficient for
that purpose, by paying to the plaintiff the proceeds
of all sales of perishable property sold by him, or of
any debts or credits collected by him or so much as
shall be necessary to satisfy the judgment; and, if any
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balance remains due and an execution shall have
been issued on the judgment, by selling under the
execution so much of the property, real or personal, as
may be necessary to satisfy the balance, if enough for
that purpose remains in his hands. Notice of the sales
must be given and the sales conducted as in other
cases of sales on execution. If, after selling all the
property attached by him remaining in his hands and
after deducting his fees and applying the proceeds,
together with the proceeds of any debts or credits collected by him, to the payment of the judgment, any
balance shall remain due, the officer must proceed to
collect the same as upon an execution in other cases.
Whenever the judgment shall have been paid*, the
officer, upon reasonable demand, must deliver to the
defendant the attached property remaining in his
hands and any proceeds of the property attached unapplied on the judgment.
(1) Proceedings where defendant prevails. If
the defendant recovers judgment against the plaintiff, any undertaking received in the action, all the
proceeds of sales and money collected by the officer
and all the property attached remaining in his hands
must be delivered to the defendant, and the attachment shall be discharged and the property released
therefrom.
(m) Liability of third persons after attachment.
All persons having in their possession or under their
control any credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant, or owing any debts to the defendant at the time of service upon them of a copy of the
writ of attachment shall be, unless such property is
delivered up or transferred or such debts are paid to
the officer, liable to the plaintiff for the amount of
such credits, property or debts, until the attachment
is discharged, or such debts, credits, or other personal
property are released from the attachment, or until
any judgment recovered by the plaintiff is satisfied.
Payment of such debts, or delivery or transfer of such
property or debts, to the officer shall be a sufficient
discharge for the same as to the defendant.
(n) Release of attachment upon real property.
Whenever an order has been made discharging or releasing an attachment upon real property, a certified
copy of such order must be filed in the office of the
county recorder in which the notice of attachment has
been filed, and shall be indexed in like manner.
(o) Attachment before maturity of claim. A
party may commence an action upon an obligation
before it is due and have an attachment against the
property of the debtor upon any one or more of the
grounds set forth in Subdivisions (a)(4), (5), (6) and
(7) of this rule. The property attached, or its proceeds,
shall be held subject to the judgment thereafter to be
rendered; but no judgment shall be rendered on such
claim until the obligation shall by its terms become
due.

Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto.
(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to enforce a judgment shall be by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which may issue at
any time within eight years after the entry of judgment, (except an execution may be stayed pursuant to
Rule 62) either in the county in which such judgment
was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript
thereof has been filed and docketed in the office of the
clerk of the district court. Notwithstanding the death
of a party after judgment execution thereon may be
issued, or such judgment may be enforced, as follows:
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of his executor or administrator, or successor in interest.
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor,
if the judgment is for the recovery of real or per-
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sonal property or the enforcement of a lien
thereon.
(b) Contents of writ and to w h o m it may be
directed. The writ of execution must be issued in the
name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of the
court and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to
the sheriff of any county in the state (and may be
issued at the same time to different counties) but
where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of
real property, it must be issued to the sheriff of the
county where the property or some part thereof is
situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of
personal property, it may be issued to a constable. It
must intelligibly refer to the judgment, stating the
court, the county where the same is entered or docketed, the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it
is for money, the amount thereof, and the amount
actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the sheriff
of the county in which it is to be executed in cases
involving real property, and shall require the officer
to proceed in accordance with the terms of the writ;
provided that if such writ is against the property of
the judgment debtor generally it may direct the constable to satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of
the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient
personal property cannot be found, then the sheriff
shall satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of his
real property.
If the judgment requires the sale of property, the
writ of execution shall recite such judgment, or the
material parts thereof, and direct the officer to execute the judgment by making the sale and applying •
the proceeds in conformity therewith. The judgment
creditor may require a certified copy of the judgment
to be served with the execution upon the party
against whom the judgment was rendered, or upon
the person or officer required thereby or by law to
obey the same, and obedience thereto may be enforced by the court.
(c) When writ to b e r e t u r n e d . The writ of execution shall be made returnable at any time within two
months after its receipt by the officer. It shall be returned to the court from which it issued, and when it
is returned the clerk must attach it to the record.
(d) Service of t h e writ. Unless the execution otherwise directs, the officer must execute the writ
against the property of the judgment debtor by levying on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient [property]; collecting or selling the choses in
action and selling the other property, and paying to
the judgment creditor or his attorney so much of the
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in
the proceeds over the judgment and accruing costs
must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court.
When there is more property of the judgment debtor
than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs within view of the officer, he must levy only
on such part of the property as the judgment debtor
may indicate, if the property indicated is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs.
When an officer has begun to serve an execution
issued out of any court on or before the return day of
such execution he may complete the service and return thereof after such return day. If he shall have
begun to serve an execution, and shall die or be incapable of completing the service and return thereof,
the same may be completed by any other officer who
might by law execute the same if delivered to him;
and if the first officer shall not have made a certificate of his doings, the second officer shall certify
whatever he shall find to have been done by the first,
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and shall add thereto a certificate of his own doings
in completing the service.
(e) Proceedings on sale of property.
(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property on
execution notice thereof must be given as follows:
(1) in case of perishable property, by posting
written notice of the time and place of sale in
three public places of the precinct or city where
the sale is to take place, for such a time as may
be reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property; (2) in case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in at
least three public places of the precinct or city
where the sale is to take place, for not less than 7
nor more than 14 days; (3) in case of real prop*
erty, by posting a similar notice, particularly describing the property, for 21 days, on the property to be sold, at the place of sale, and also in at
least 3 public places of the precinct or city where
the property to be sold is situated, and publishing
a copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3
successive weeks immediately preceding the sale,
in some newspaper published in the county, if
there is one.
(2) Postponement. If at the time appointed
for the sale of any real or personal property on
execution the officer shall deem it expedient and
for the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of purchasers, or other
sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from
time to time, until the same shall be completed;
and in every such case he shall make public declaration thereof at the time and place previously
appointed for the sale, and if such postponement
is for a longer time than one day, notice thereof
shall be given in the same manner as the original
notice of such sale is required to be given.
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be made at auction to the
highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock
a.m. and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property
has been sold to satisfy the execution no more
shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution nor his deputy shall become a purchaser,
or be interested in any purchase at such sale.
When the sale is of personal property capable of
manual delivery it must be within view of those
who attend the sale, and it must be sold in such
parcels as are likely to bring the highest price;
and when the sale is of real property, consisting
of several known lots or parcels, they must be
sold separately; or when a portion of such real
property is claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold separately, such portion must
be thus sold. All sales of real property must be
made at the courthouse of the county in which
the property, or some part thereof, is situated.
The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may
also direct the order in which the property, real
or personal, shall be sold, when such property
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of
articles which can be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such directions.
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid
shall be deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the
purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him
for the property struck off to him at a sale under
execution, the officer may again sell the property
at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss
is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay,
in addition to being liable on such bid, is guilty of

a contempt of court and may be punished accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his discretion, thereafter reject
any other bid of such person.
(5) Personal property. When the purchaser
of any personal property pays the purchase
money, the officer making the sale shall deliver
the property to the purchaser (if such property is
capable of manual delivery) and shall execute
and deliver to him a certificate of sale and payment. Such certificate shall state that all right,
title and interest which the debtor had in and to
such property on the day the execution or attachment was levied, and any right, title and interest
since acquired, is transferred to the purchaser.
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: (1) a particular description of the real property sold; (2) the price
paid by him for each lot or parcel if sold separately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to
the effect that all right, title, interest and claim
of the judgment debtor in and to the property is
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where
such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall
be stated also. A duplicate of such certificate
shall be filed for record by the officer in the office
of the recorder of the county. The real property
sold shall be subject to redemption, except where
the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a twoyears' unexpired term, in which event said sale is
absolute.
(f) Redemption from sale.
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be
redeemed by the following persons or their successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a
creditor having a lien by judgment or mortgage
on the property sold, or on some share or part
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property
was sold.
(2) Redemption; how made. At the time of
redemption the person seeking the same may
make payment of the amount required to the person from whom the property is being redeemed,
or for him to the officer who made the sale, or his
successor in office. At the same time the redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from
whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his
notice to the officer: (1) a certified copy of the
docket of the judgment under which he claims
the right to redeem, or, if he redeems upon a
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the
record thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an
assignment, properly acknowledged or proved
where the same is necessary to establish his
claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his agent
showing the amount then actually due on the
lien.
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be
paid. The property may be redeemed from the
purchaser within six months after the sale on
paying the amount of his purchase with 6 percent
thereon in addition, together with the amount of
any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum
for fire insurance and necessary maintenance,
upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the
property which the purchaser may have paid
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking
redemption, other than the judgment under

which said purchase was made, the amount of
such hen, with interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to
whether any sum demanded for redemption is
reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out
of which execution or order authorizing the sale
was issued, and at the same time file with the
court a petition setting forth the item or items
demanded to which he objects, together with his
grounds of objection; and thereupon the court
shall enter an order fixing a time for hearing of
such objections. A copy of the petition and order
fixing time for hearing shall be served on the
purchaser not less than two days before the day
of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the
court shall enter an order determining the
amount required for redemption. In the event an
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the
clerk is required, the person seeking redemption
shall pay to the clerk such additional amount
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper certificate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the
court for redemption.
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property
is redeemed bv a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days
after the last redemption and within six months
after the sale, redeem the property from such last
redemptioner in the same manner as provided in
the preceding subdivision, upon paying the sum
of such last redemption, with three percent
thereon in addition and the amount of any assessment or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire
insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep or
repair of any improvements upon the property
which the last redemptioner may have paid
thereon, with interest on such amount, and, in
addition, the amount of any lien held by such last
redemptioner prior to his own, with interest.
Written notice of any redemption shall be given
to the officer and a duplicate filed with the recorder of the county. Similar notice shall be
given of any taxes or assessments or any sums for
fire insurance, and necessary maintenance,
upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the
property, paid by the person redeeming, or the
amount of any lien acquired, other than upon
which the redemption was made. Failure to file
such notice shall relieve any subsequent redemptioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or other liens.
(5) Where no redemption is made. If no redemption is made within six months after the
sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty
days have elapsed and no other redemption by a
creditor has been made and notice thereof has
been given, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed at the expiration of six months after the sale. If the judgment debtor redeems, he must make the same
payments as are required to effect a redemption
by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of
the sale is terminated and he is restored to his
estate. Upon a redemption by the debtor, the person to whom the payment is made must execute
and deliver to him a certificate of redemption,
duly acknowledged. Such certificate must be filed
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and recorded in the office of the county recorder
concerning the sale, or because the property sold
where the property is situated.
was not subject to execution and sale, the court
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of
purchaser from the time of sale until a redempsuch party and after such notice to the judgment
tion, and a redemptioner from the time of his
debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the
redemption until another redemption, is entitled
original judgment in the name of the petitioner
to receive from the tenant in possession the rents
for the amount paid by such purchaser at the
of the property sold or the value of the use and
sale, with interest thereon from the time of payoccupation thereof. But when any rents or profits
ment at the same rate that the original judgment
have been received by the judgment creditor or
bore; and the judgment so revived shall have the
purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the propsame force and effect as would an original judgerty thus sold preceding such redemption, the
ment of the date of the revival.
amounts of such rents and profits shall be a
(hi Contribution and reimbursement; how encredit upon the redemption money to be paid; and forced. When upon an execution against several perif the redemptioner or judgment debtor, before sons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is
the expiration of the time allowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property
or creditor, or his assigns, a written and verified of one. or one of them pays, without a sale, more than
statement of the amounts of such rents and his proportion, and the right of contribution exists, he
profits thus received, the period for redemption is may compel such contribution from the others; and
extended five days after such sworn statement is where a judgment against several is upon an obligagiven by such purchaser or his assigns to such tion of one or more as security for the others, and the
redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or his surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by
assigns shall for a period of one month from and sale of property or otherwise, he may require reimafter such demand, fail or refuse to give such bursement from the principal. The person entitled to
statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, contribution or reimbursement shall, within one
within sixty days after such demand, bring an month after payment, or sale of his property in tHe
action to compel an accounting and disclosure of event there is a sale, file in the court where the judgsuch rents and profits, and until fifteen days ment was rendered a notice of such payment and his
from and after the final determination of such claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the
action the right of redemption is extended to such filing of such notice the clerk must make an entry
thereof in the margin of the docket which shall have
redemptioner or debtor,
the effect of a judgment against the other judgment
(g) Remedies of purchaser.
debtors to the extent of their liability for contribution
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time or reimbursement.
allowed for redemption, the court may restrain
(i) Payment of judgment by person indebted to
the commission of waste on the property, upon
judgment
debtor. After the issuance of an execution
motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser,
or his successor in interest. But it is not waste for and before its return, any person indebted to the judgthe person in possession of the property at the ment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of his
time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, debt, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satduring the period allowed for redemption, to con- isfy the execution, and the officer's receipt is a suffitinue to use it in the same manner in which it cient discharge for the amount paid.
(j) Where property is claimed by third person.
was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary
course of husbandry, or to make the necessary If an officer shall proceed to levy any execution on
repairs or buildings thereon or to use wood or any goods or chattels claimed by any person other
timber on the property therefor, or for the repair than the defendant, or should he be requested by the
of fences, or for fuel for his family while he occu- judgment creditor so to do, such officer may require
pies the property. After his estate has become the judgment creditor to give an undertaking, with
absolute, the purchaser or his successor in inter- good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damest may maintain an action to recover damages ages that he may sustain by reason of the detention
for injury to the property by the tenant in posses- or sale of such property; and until such undertaking
sion after sale and before possession is delivered is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against
under the conveyance.
such property.
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain posses(k) Order for appearance of judgment debtor;
sion of property or is dispossessed thereof or arrest At any time when execution may issue on a
evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregular- judgment, the court from which an execution might
ities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment
because the property sold was not subject to exe- creditor, with or without notice as the court may decution and sale, or because of the reversal or dis- termine, issue an order requiring the judgment
charge of the judgment, a purchaser of property debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to apsold on execution, or his successor in interest, pear before the court or a master at a specified time
fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed and place to answer concerning his or its property. A
thereof or evicted therefrom, the court having ju- judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer
risdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party thereof, may be required to attend outside the county
and after such notice to the judgment creditor as in which he resides, but the court may make such
the court may prescribe, enter judgment against order as to mileage and expenses as is just. The order
such judgment creditor for the price paid by the may also restrain the judgment debtor from disposing
purchaser, together with interest. In the alterna- of any nonexempt property pending the hearing.
tive, if such purchaser or his successor in inter- Upon the hearing such proceedings may be had for
est, fails to recover possession of any property or the application of the property of the judgment debtor
is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in toward the satisfaction of the judgment as on execuconsequence of irregularity in the proceedings tion against such property.
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In aid of an order requiring the attendance of the
judgment debtor, the court may, upon satisfactory
proof by affidavit or otherwise, that there is danger of
the debtor's absconding, order the sheriff to arrest the
debtor and bring him before the court, and may order
such judgment debtor to enter into an undertaking
with sufficient sureties, that he will attend from time
to time before the court or master, as may be directed
during the pendency of the proceedings and until the
final determination thereof, and will not in the meantime dispose of any portion of his property not exempt
from execution. In default of entering into such undertaking, he may be committed to jail.
(1) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor.
At any time when execution may issue on a judgment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the court that any person or corporation
has property of such judgment debtor or is indebted to
him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt
from execution, the court may order such person or
corporation or any officer or agent thereof, to appear
before the court or a master at a specified time and
place to answer concerning the same. Witness fees
and mileage, if any, may be awarded by the court.
(m) O r d e r prohibiting transfer of p r o p e r t y . If it
appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have
property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to
him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt
from execution, claims an interest in the property
adverse to such judgment debtor or denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or corporation to refrain from transferring or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until such time as may
reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to
bring an action to determine such interest or claim
and prosecute the same to judgment. Such order may
be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon
such terms as may be just.
(n) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in any proceedings brought under
Subdivisions (k) and (1) of this rule in the same manner as upon the trial of an issue.
(o) Order for property to be applied on judgment. The court or master may order any property of
the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
the hands of such debtor, or any other person, or due
to the judgment debtor, to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment.
(p) Appointment of receiver. The court niay appoint a receiver of the property of the judgment
debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid
any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its further order therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified
copy of his appointment shall be recorded in the office
of the recorder of the county in which any real estate
sought to be affected thereby is situated.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
BOUNDARIES
n. STATE
ORDINANCE
m.
IV. ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE
V. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
VII. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
vm.
IX. CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE
APPORTIONMENT
X. EDUCATION
XI. COUNTIES, CITIES AND TOWNS
XII. CORPORATIONS
XIII. REVENUE AND TAXATION
XIV. PUBLIC DEBT
XV. MILITIA
XVI. LABOR
XVII. WATER RIGHTS
FORESTRY
xvin.
XIX. PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND STATE
INSTITUTIONS
XX. PUBLIC LANDS
XXI. SALARIES
XXII. MISCELLANEOUS
XXIII. AMENDMENT AND REVISION
XXIV. SCHEDULE
PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we,
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate
the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]

Section
21. [Slavery forbidden.]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Rights retained by people.]
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.

1896

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments are founded on their authority for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1896
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land.
1896
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — N o property qualification to vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed.
The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep a n d bear
a r m s for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or t h e state, as well a s for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; b u t nothing herein shall
prevent t h e legislature from defining t h e lawful use
of arms.
1985
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
1896
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except:
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SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS
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vs.
DOROTHY D'ASTON, LISA ASTON, and
ERYCK C. ASTON.

Case No. 900223-CA

Defendants-Appellant.

In accordance with the directive of Rule 37(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, appellee Bruno D'Aston hereby suggests to the Court that the above-entitled appeal
is moot. The ground for this suggestion is that the appeal challenges the order of the District
Court directing the distribution of certain personal property to the parties, and the property has
already been distributed in accordance with the District Court's order.
This suggestion is supported by a memorandum of points and authorities which is filed
herewith.
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